Faith Pepela
Faith Pepela is a doctoral scholar at Koç University and a Young Professional Policy Analyst at Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA)
Democracy has been historically described as ‘the government by the people, for the people and of the people’. With the uprise of coups in western Africa and mass demonstrations in support of coups, the question begs; are coups a different way of exercising democracy or a threat to democracy and constitutionalism?
The governance systems embraced in African states are those of a rule based order anchored on constitutionalism. Free and fair electoral processes are used to decide governance by voting in of popular candidates. However, the recent rise of coups with massive support from the people call for an assessment of the governance concept. Rejectors of the liberal democracy, western political ideology argue that it upholds a racialised colonial order and privatisation of government structures. They hold these practices to be Eurocentric models of governance and argue that coups have become a tool for the exercise of direct democracy.
Colonial powers initiated a system of ethnic politics in their colonies – the classic strategy of ‘divide and rule’, which involved simplifying and sometimes creating ethnic identities and thereby exacerbating ethnic tensions. This ethnic politics could not be readily managed and contained by the liberal democratic constitutions that colonial powers bequeathed to their colonies upon independence. Ethnic politics in this way was built into the politics of the post-colonial state. The colonial state had sought to establish order and stability, a rule of law that was compatible with the extraction and exploitation of the resources of the colony.
Post-colonial elites, corrupt and authoritarian leaders in Africa, seized on the same apparatus, then, to enrich themselves and to expand their power by targeting other ethnic groups as economic rivals and threats to the continuing prosperity and well-being of their own majority ethnic group, invariably identified as the state itself. This usurpation of power is often procured through flawed elections. In a democratic exercise meant to establish a government by the people, for the people and of the people, irregular elections encroach on the will of the people facilitating oppression.
Some African political elite have used elections to consolidate power through an array of strategies, including amending the constitution to alter term limits and age restrictions, interfering with the freedom of the press, preventing the sharing of elected official’s track records, suppressing opposition voices, and resorting to military intimidation to quell dissent. These actions often coincide with creation of hostile conditions for multiparty democracy.
Poor governance results in loss of legitimacy of a government in the eyes of the public and is often a gateway for coups. The unfortunate outcome of coups is the suspension of constitutions and denial of human rights. With coups being the antithesis of constitutional governance and constitutionalism, it is possible to establish a connection between governance deficits and coups. The question of whether coups pose a threat to democracy and human rights lies at the intersection of decolonisation and constitutionalism.
The West African Coups
From 2020, West Africa has witnessed a growing number of coup d’états. In the past 3 years, military machinery has overthrown the presidents of Mali (August 2020 and May 2021), Guinea (2021), Burkina Faso (January and September 2022), and recently Gabon. Despite the sequence of events in the region, the trend does not seem to suggest the wave of coups will spread to the rest of Africa, as each coup was triggered by each nation’s peculiar history and context.
In August 2020, Mali’s National Committee for the Salvation of the People publicly accused President Ibrahim Keita’s government of corruption and, overthrowing him in a coup, concurrently declared its assumption of governance responsibilities. After the 2020 coup, ECOWAS demanded the installation of a civilian president and fresh elections in February 2022. This demand was initially respected, with Bah N’Daw being fronted as president and coup leader Assimi Goïta as vice president. However, Goïta later deposed N’Daw and declared himself interim president in May 2021, less than a year later. Goïta later announced his preferred election timeline, scheduling it for July 2024.
In September 2021, Guinea followed a similar script when Col. Mamady Doumbouya overthrew President Alpha Condé, announcing that ‘the duty of a soldier is to save the country’. In Burkina Faso, Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Damiba cited the severity of the ongoing Islamic insurgency as the reason for the coup, which was claimed by the Patriotic Movement for Protection and Restoration. He pledged to step down once the security situation was under control. The same promise of transitioning from a military regime to a civilian government was made by the Juntas in Mali and Guinea. Nevertheless, despite these assurances, the proposed elections appear to be years away. Moreover, both Mali and Burkina Faso have witnessed further coups driven by internal divisions.
Which way out?
The performance of the military juntas in the West African countries is no better than the governments they overthrew. In Guinea, Doumbouya continued the erosion of civil liberties that Condé began by criminalising anti-government protests and attempting to dissolve the National Front for the Defence of the Constitution that had previously served as Condé’s opposition. The Front’s leaders were either arrested or driven to exile. In addition, the junta has faced criticism from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
Similarly, in Burkina Faso, Damiba’s government has struggled to contain the security situation since the January coup, with Jihadists continuing to expand their influence. While some progress was made in strengthening the army’s capabilities, it fell short of the expectations of Gen. Ibrahim Traoré. As a result, he led the second coup of the year, overthrowing Damiba, citing the worsening security conditions in the nation. Further, the coups have led to serious setbacks to democracy in Mali.
Coups have devastating effects on a country’s social and political culture. Decades worth of study on the coup phenomenon in the region reveal that coup leaders seldom act in the nation’s best interests. The region risks coup leaders refusing to cede power to civilian leaders. Instead, they are likely to resort to authoritarianism. Some recent coups have been dubbed good coups as they led to quick formation of civilian governments. However, these too elevated the military’s profile at the expense of participation of civic democracy-enhancing institutions and organisations, resulting in a weak connection between ordinary citizens and politics. Stronger bonds in transfer of power are facilitated by transfers led by political parties, trade unions and other civilian groups. But as Nic Cheeseman notes of Malian democracy, it ‘rested on extremely hollow foundations’. This then enables authoritarianism, facilitates coups, and institutionalises military takeovers in Mali.
Recommendations
Coups are a threat to democracy and constitutionalism as they are usually accompanied by a suspension of the rule of law. With every new coup, the phenomenon becomes entrenched in a nation’s fabric, as demonstrated by the efficiency of the execution of subsequent coups and the improved ability to hold onto power and evade pressure from the international community. Effective measures are thus necessary to address this problem.
The first line of defence against state capture and undemocratic practices is an empowered civil society. Citizens ought to be empowered to not only identify but also reject unconstitutional practices. Empowerment of the electorate should be targeted at women groups, human rights defenders, professional associations (especially those dealing with the rule of law and democratic governance), labour unions, information sharing entities, and development organisations. Further, the international community can support the fight against coup culture by supporting civic empowerment.
Second, African governments can strengthen governance structures by investing in independent oversight institutions such as the judiciary and electoral bodies, a vibrant media, a strong populist legislature, and effective conflict prevention mechanisms to provide checks and balances on the executive.
Third, regional support for anti-coup norms from the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS is needed. Although a legislative framework in the AU and ECOWAS is already in place, their reaction to the recent coups reflects a waning resolve in enforcing anti-coup norms. Regional bodies ought to enforce the provisions in their enabling legal instruments by imposing sanctions and referring perpetrators of coups for prosecution without exceptions.
Regrettably, the East African Community (EAC), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) have not taken a position on term limits evasion. Whereas, the ECOWAS Parliament adopted a non-binding resolution to ban the extension of presidential rule beyond two terms in the region. As accountability structures responsible for upholding of peace and democracy, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) ought to adopt a united stance against the evasion of term limits, imposing strong sanctions to discourage the coup phenomenon.
Cite as: Pepela, F. (2023) Coups: Direct democracy or threat to democracy? Available at: https://ancl-radc.org.za/blog/coups-direct-democracy-or-threat-to-democracy (Accessed: [date] [month] [year])